We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We de…ne the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network speci…es the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and e¢ ciency.
Introduction
The organization of individual agents into networks and groups has an important role in the determination of the outcome of many social and economic interactions.
For instance, networks of personal contacts are important in obtaining information about job opportunities. Goods can be traded and exchanged through networks, rather than markets, of buyers and sellers. Networks also play important roles in providing mutual insurance especially in developing countries. 1 Partitioning of societies into groups is also important in many contexts, such as the provision of public goods and formation of alliances, cartels and federations. The understanding of how and why such networks and groups form and the precise way in which they a¤ect outcomes of social and economic interactions has been apprehended separately by the coalition theory and the network theory.
One limit of both theories is that it cannot incorporate the existence of bilateral agreements among agents belonging to di¤erent coalitions -that is commonly observed in many situations. A …rst situation has to do with the formation of R&D joint ventures and of bilateral R&D collaborations. On the one hand, Bloch (1995) has analyzed the formation of associations of …rms, like R&D joint ventures or groups of …rms adopting common standards, in an oligopolistic industry. On the other hand, Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) or Goyal and Joshi (2003) have analyzed the incentives for R&D collaboration between horizontally related …rms by considering that collaboration links are bilateral and are embedded within a broader network of similar links with other …rms. However, it may happen that …rms A and B may decide to form an R&D joint venture while …rms B and C sign a bilateral R&D agreement. What is the architecture of the resulting collaboration network and the structure of associations that are likely to emerge?
A second situation has to do with the formation of free-trade agreements and customs unions. On the one hand, Yi (1996) has studied the incentives for countries to form regional free trade associations and customs unions, and the strategic stability of those particular trading regimes. On the other hand, Goyal and Joshi (2005) and Furusawa and Konishi (2007) have investigated the formation of bilateral free trade agreements as a network formation game. Thus, the literature has considered that countries participate either in the formation of bilateral free trade agreements 1 Jackson (2003 Jackson ( , 2005 provides surveys of models of network formation. or in the formation of customs unions or multilateral free trade agreements, but not in the formation of both types of agreements at the same time. This is a strong restriction indeed since many countries are involved in both types of agreements at the same time: Mexico belongs to NAFTA and has a bilateral free trade agreement with the European Community, while the United States have no speci…c trade agreement with the European Community. What are the incentives for countries to form bilateral free trade agreements and/or customs unions?
There are many other situations where agents are part of a network and belong to groups or coalitions. It is very common that …rms having some common interest within an industry regroup themselves into an industry association. Moreover, in various industries, such as automobiles, clothing, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and food, manufacturers develop networks of exchange both with input suppliers and retailers or wholesalers. 2 In labour markets, workers are linked to each other within each …rm through a hierarchy -that is, a network -and, at the same time workers may group themselves into unions. Municipalities are connected to each other through a network of roads, railway tracks or waterways, and they may share some common facilities or emergency services. Individuals are living their social interactions in clubs or communities as well as through friendship networks.
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We de…ne the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network speci…es the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition.
This new framework forces us to rede…ne key notions of theory of networks, value and allocation rules, and to introduce a new solution concept : contractual stability.
The idea of contractual stability is that adding or deleting a link needs the consent of coalition partners. For instance, in the context of R&D alliances, …rms may decide to have a common laboratory with some partners, while developing bilateral R&D agreements with other partners. The signing of a bilateral R&D agreement may need the consent of those partners within the common laboratory or joint ven- 2 Kranton and Minehart (2000) have analyzed the endogenous formation of networks between input suppliers and manufacturers while Mauleon, Sempere and Vannetelbosch (2005) have studied the formation of networks between manufacturers and retailers. Wang and Watts (2006) have examined the formation of buyer-seller networks when sellers can form an association of sellers to pool their customers. ture. Moreover, the formation of new coalition structures may need the consent of original coalition partners. Thus, once a coalition has been formed, the consent of coalitional partners is required in order to add or delete links that a¤ect some coalition partners, or to modify the existing coalition. As in Drèze and Greenberg (1980) the word "contractual" is used to re ‡ect the notion that coalitions are contracts binding all members and subject to revision only with consent of coalitional partners. 3 Two di¤erent decision rules for consent are analyzed: simple majority or unanimity. 4 When allocations do not depend on coalition structures, there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the unanimity decision rule.
Looking at some classical models from network theory (co-author model, symmetric connections model, model of buyer-seller networks), we observe that requiring the consent of group members under the simple majority may help to reconcile stability and e¢ ciency. When allocations depend on coalition structures, there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. However, if the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule is adopted, then a contractually stable coalitional network always exists only under the unanimity decision rule.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the framework of coalitional networks. In Section 3 we de…ne the concept of contractual stability. In Section 4 we derive some results about the existence of contractually stable networks and we look whether e¢ cient coalitional networks are likely to be stable or not. In Section 5 we comment upon some of the features of the framework showing that it is general enough to study the emergence of community structures. In addition, it can be extended so that overlapping collections of individuals may arise. In Section 6 we conclude. 3 One example mentioned by Drèze and Greenberg (1980) are rules governing entry and exit in labor cooperatives. A new partner will enter the cooperative only if (i) he wishes to come in; (ii) his new partners wish to accept him; and (iii) he obtains from his former partners permission to withdraw (only if he was before member of another cooperative). 4 For instance, the unanimity decision rule is used in the European Community whenever a new bilateral free trade agreement is proposed by any country member.
Coalitional networks
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the …nite set of players who are connected in some network relationship and who belong to some coalitions or communities. A coalitional network (g; P ) consists of a network g 2 G N and a coalition structure P 2 P. A network g is simply a list of which pairs of players are linked to each other with ij 2 g indicating that i and j are linked under the network g. Let G N = fg : g g N g denote the set of all possible networks on N and g N is the set of all subsets of N of size 2. A coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m g is simply a partition of the player set N ,
S a = N and S a 6 = ? for a = 1; :::; m. Let #S a be the cardinality of coalition S a and S(i) 2 P be the coalition whose player i belongs. Let P denote the …nite set of coalition structures. A sub-coalitional network of (g; P )
is (h; Q) with h g and Q P . For instance, if N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g, then (g; P ) = (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g, ff1g; f2; 3; 4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg) is the coalitional network in which there is a link between players 1 and 2, a link between players 2 and 3, a link between players 4 and 5, a link between players 5 and 6, and a link between players 7 and 8, and players 2, 3, 4 and 5 are in the same coalition while players 6, 7 and 8 are in another coalition and player 1 is alone. This coalitional network (g; P ) = (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g; ff1g; f2; 3; 4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg) is depicted in Figure 1 . Let N (g) = fi j 9j such that ij 2 gg be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g. Let n(g) be the cardinality of N (g). For any Q P , N (Q) = fi 2 S : S 2 Qg is the set of players that belong to some coalition S 2 Q.
Let N (g + Q) = N (g) [ N (Q). Finally, let N (g; P ) be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g or that belong to a coalition S 2 P such that at least one member of S has a link in the network g.
De…nition 1.
A component of a coalitional network (g; P ) is a nonempty subcoalitional network (h; Q), with h g and Q = fS k : S k 2 P g P , such that (i) h = fij 2 g : 9S; S 0 2 Q such that i 2 S and j 2 S 0 g;
(ii) for all S; S 0 2 Q there exists a sequence of coalitions S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S K with S 1 = S and S K = S 0 such that for any l 2 f1; :::; K 1g, S l 2 Q and there exists i l i l+1 2 h with i l 2 S l and i l+1 2 S l+1 .
A component (h; Q) of (g; P ) consists of a nonempty sub-network h of g and the coalitions in P that contain at least one player with a link in h. The set of components of (g; P ) is denoted as C(g; P ). Under this de…nition of a component, a coalition whose members have no links is not considered as a component.
and j 2 N (h+Q) there exists a sequence of coalitions S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S K with i 2 S 1 2 Q and j 2 S K 2 Q such that for any l 2 f1; :::; K 1g, S l 2 Q and there exists i l i l+1 2 h with i l 2 S l and i l+1 2 S l+1 .
Take the coalitional network (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g; ff1g; f2; 3g; f4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg).
The connected sub-coalitional networks are (f12; 23g, ff1g; f2; 3gg), (f23g, ff2; 3gg), (f12g, ff1g, f2; 3gg), (f45; 56; 78g, ff4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg), (f45g, ff4; 5gg), (f56g, ff4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg), (f78g, ff6; 7; 8gg). The components are the maximal connected sub-coalitional networks, that is (f12; 23g; ff1g; f2; 3gg) and (f45; 56; 78g; ff4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg). These two components are depicted in Figure 2 . Component additivity is a condition that rules out externalities across components but still allows them within components. A coalitional network (g; P ) is e¢ cient relative to a partition value function v if v(g; P ) v(g 0 ; P 0 ) for all g 0 2 G N and all P 0 2 P.
We also wish to keep track of how that value is allocated or distributed among the players in any coalitional networks. An allocation rule is a function Y :
for all v, g and P .
It is important to note that an allocation rule depends on g, P and v. This allows an allocation rule to take full account of a player i's role in the network and in the coalition structure. This includes not only what the network con…guration and coalition structure are, but also and how the value generated depends on the overall network and coalition structure. A coalitional network (g; P ) is Pareto e¢ cient relative to partition value function v and allocation rule Y if no g 0 2 G N and no P 0 2 P exist such that Y i (g 0 ; P 0 ; v) Y i (g; P; v) for all i with strict inequality for some i.
We propose next three allocation rules that will be helpful for obtaining existence of stable coalitional networks. For any component additive partition value function v 2 V, the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is such that for any (h; Q) 2 C(g; P ) and each i 2 N (h; Q),
For any partition value function v 2 V that is not component additive, 
Contractual stability
A simple way to analyze the coalitional networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that no coalition bene…ts from altering the coalitional network. What about possible deviations ? A coalitional network (g 0 ; P 0 ) is obtainable from (g; P ) via S, S N , if (i) ij 2 g 0 and ij = 2 g implies fi; jg S, and (ii) ij = 2 g 0 and ij 2 g implies fi; jg \ S 6 = ?, and (iii) fS a n (S a \ S) : S a 2 P g = fS 0 a 2 P 0 : S 0 a N n Sg, and
Condition (i) asks that any new links that are added can only be between players inside S. Condition (ii) requires that there must be at least one player belonging to S for the deletion of a link. 5 Y if for any S N , (g 0 ; P 0 ) obtainable from (g; P ) via S and i 2 S such that
Under the unanimity decision rule, the move from a coalitional network (g; P )
to any obtainable coalitional network (g 0 ; P 0 ) needs the consent of every deviating player as well as the consent of every member of the initial coalitions of the deviating players. Then, a coalitional network is contractually stable 6 if any deviating player or any member of the former coalitions of the deviating players is not better o¤ from the deviation to any obtainable coalitional network (g 0 ; P 0 ). 7 5 These …rst two conditions have been introduced …rst by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) to de…ne the netwoks obtainable from a given network by a coalition S. 6 This de…nition of contractual stability would revert to Dutta Y if for any S N , (g 0 ; P 0 ) obtainable from (g; P ) via S and i 2 S such that
Under the simple majority decision rule, the move from a coalitional network Players form links with each other in order to exchange information and form coalitions in order to share communication costs. If player i is "connected" to player j, by a path of t links, then player i receives a payo¤ of t from his indirect connection with player j. It is assumed that 0 < < 1, and so the payo¤ t decreases as the 8 The relationship between contractual stability under any decision rule embodied by a quota is obvious: a quota q 0 < q re…nes stability. That is, the set of contractually stable coalitional networks under q 0 is (weakly) included in the set of contractually stable coalitional networks under q. Indeed, the probability to block a deviation is greater the higher the quota q. When the quota approaches zero (q ! 0), coalitional membership has no matter in terms of consent. path connecting players i and j increases; thus information that travels a long distance becomes diluted and is less valuable than information obtained from a closer neighbor. Each direct link ij results in a cost c to both i and j. This cost can be interpreted as the time a player must spend with another player in order to maintain a direct link. The communication costs are shared equally within groups. Player i's payo¤ from a network g in a coalition S(i) is given by
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) = 1 if there is no path between i and j). Inside each group, the consent of members is needed in order to modify the network and/or the coalition structure.
The contractually stable coalitional networks in case of three players under the simple majority decision rule are depicted in Figure 3 . But what happens for more than three players? For There are many contractually stable networks in the connections model when communication costs are shared within groups. However, it is easy to …nd an example where a contractually stable network fails to exist. Take N = f1; 2; 3g and Figure 4 . Proof. Take the e¢ cient network g . Then, (g ; fN g) is contractually stable. Indeed, for all (g 0 ; P ) obtainable from (g ; fN g) via S there is a player i 2 N such that
What about the existence of contractually stable coalitional networks under the simple majority decision rule? Let D(g; P ) be the set of coalitional networks that are obtainable from (g; P ) via pro…table deviations that do not modify P . That is, given (g; P ), (g 0 ; P ) 2 D(g; P ) if (i) 9S N such that (g 0 ; P ) is obtainable from (g; P ) via S and (ii) Y i (g 0 ; P; v) > Y i (g; P; v) 8i 2 S. A coalitional network (g; P ) is critical if there exists a coalition T that can block any pro…table deviation obtainable from (g; P ) that do not modify P . That is, a coalitional network (g; P )
is critical with respect to partition value function v and allocation rule Y if 9T N such that (i) #T minf#D(g; P ); n=2g and (ii) Y i (g 0 ; P; v) Y i (g; P; v) 8i 2 T , 8g 0 2 G N such that (g 0 ; P ) 2 D(g; P ). is critical with respect to partition value function v and allocation rule Y , then 9P 2 P such that (g; P ) is contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule.
Proof. Since the coalitional network (g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) is critical, there exists T N with #T minf#D(g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg); n=2g and such that all its members do not prefer the allocation they could obtain in any coalitional network (g 0 ; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) obtainable from (g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) via S, S \ T = ? 9 In addition take any network g where some player i receives the maximum he can get for all g 0 2 G N . Then, (g; fN g) is contractually stable since all moves to any (g 0 ; P ) obtainable from (g; fN g) via S is blocked by player i. with (g 0 ; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) 2 D((g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg)). Two cases have to be considered.
First, assume that minf#D(g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg); n=2g = #D(g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg).
There always exists a coalitional network (g; P ) that is contractually stable under the simple majority rule. We simply need to match a member of each coalition S of deviators to coalitional networks (g 0 ; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) 2 D((g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg))
with some member of coalition T .
Second, assume that minf#D(g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg); n=2g = n=2 which implies that #T n=2. Then, the coalitional network (g; fN g) is contractually stable under the simple majority rule since the members of coalition T will block any possible deviation from (g; fN g).
To illustrate this result we reconsider Jackson and Watts exchange networks model where four players get value from trading goods with each other. Inside each trade association, the consent of association members is needed in order to modify the exchange network and/or the coalition structure. Under the unanimity decision rule, (f12; 23; 34g; fN g) is contractually stable. Under the simple majority decision rule, (f12; 23; 34g; ff1; 2g; f3; 4gg) is contractually stable. Notice that (f12; 23; 34g; ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4gg) is critical. Indeed, the coalitions f1; 2g and f3; 4g will block all pro…table deviations from the network f12; 23; 34g as shown in Figure 5 . Example 3. The co-author model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) . Each player is a researcher who spends time writing papers and each player may belong to a research lab. If two players are linked, then they are working on a paper together.
The amount of time researcher i spends on a given project is inversely related to the number of projects n i that he is involved in. Formally, player i's payo¤ is given by
Inside each lab, the consent of lab members is needed in order to modify the network and/or the coalition structure. The possible coalitional networks and their associated payo¤s in the co-author model with three players are depicted in Figure   6 . Proof. For n even, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, p.57) have shown that a network g consisting of n=2 separate pairs is e¢ cient. Since v(g; P ) = v(g) for all P 2 P, we have that (g; P ) is e¢ cient for all P 2 P. Thus, for any (g 0 ; P 0 ) obtainable from (g; P ) via deviations of S we have that at least one player j, with S \ S(j) 6 = ?, is worse o¤ at (g 0 ; P 0 ) compared to (g; P ). We show now that any of such deviations will be blocked. Two cases have to be considered. First, if S \ S(j) 6 = ? and j 2 S then j will block the deviation since this deviation is making j worse o¤. Second, if S \ S(j) 6 = ? and j = 2 S then j will block the deviation since j's agreement is needed given that j's partner in S(j) belongs to the deviating coalition S.
Example 4. The symmetric connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) .
Each player forms links with other players in order to exchange information and each player bears his own costs of maintaining direct links. Player i's payo¤ from a network g is given by
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) = 1 if there is no path between i and j), 2 (0; 1) and c is the cost of maintaining a direct link. Jackson and Wolinsky have shown that for intermediate costs a con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency will arise. For < c < + ((n 2)=2) 2 , a star network encompassing all players is the unique e¢ cient network but is not pairwise (nor strongly) stable. A star network is simply a network in which all players are linked to one central player and there are no other links. However, once we allow players to belong to coalitions and that deviations need the consent of more than half of the members of the initial coalitions of the deviating players, then the con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency may be resolved. with other players (that is, #S(i ) 2), those players will block any deviation from the star network encompassing all players.
Example 5. A model of buyer-seller networks (Kranton and Minehart, 2001 ).
There is one seller who has an indivisible object for sale and n potential buyers who have utilities for the object, denoted u i , which are uniformly and independently distributed on [0; 1]. The object to sell has no value to the seller. Each buyer knows his own valuation, but only the distribution over the buyers'valuations. The seller also knows only the distribution of buyers'valuations. The object is sold by means of a standard second-price auction. Only the buyers who are linked to the seller participate to the auction. Let k be the number of buyers linked to the seller. For a cost per link of c s to the seller and c b to the buyer, the allocation rule for any network g with k 1 links between the buyers and the seller is
if i is a buyer without any links.
The value function is Take k 6 = 0. Since (k (k + 1)) 1 c b ((k + 1) (k + 2)) 1 c b , the buyers already linked to the seller will block the addition of new links to the e¢ cient network. Moreover, the buyers linked to the seller have no incentives to cut their links. Since (k 1) (k + 1) 1 k c s (k 2) (k ) 1 (k 1) c s which reverts 2 (k (k + 1)) 1 c s , the seller does not want to cut links to the e¢ cient network.
Take now k = 0. Since the empty network is the e¢ cient one, if the seller wants to link to a buyer, then this buyer does not want, or vice versa.
In the original model of buyer seller networks, a con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency is likely to occur when c s > 0. However, once the seller may need the consent of the buyers linked to him, the e¢ cient network becomes stable. While the seller and the buyers with no link have incentives to add links, the decision for adding new links will be turned down by the buyers who are already linked to the seller.
Thus, we observe that contractual stability may help to stabilize the e¢ cient networks in some classical examples. However, contractual stability may also stabilize ine¢ cient networks that were not stable before requiring the consent of group members.
Allocations depend on coalition structures
We now study the existence of contractually stable coalitional networks when values and allocation rules depend on coalition structures. Let g S be the set of all subsets of S N of size 2. Let Proof. Given the algorithm and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce , the players in N (g 1 ; Q 1 ) obtain the highest possible payo¤ they can get. So, no player in N (g 1 ; Q 1 ) will deviate from (g; P ) v;ce . Players in any N (g k ; Q k ), k = 2; :::; K, obtain the highest possible payo¤ they can get among the players in N n [ i k 1 N (g i ; Q i ). However, their payo¤ is smaller than the payo¤ of players in N (g j ; Q j ) with j = 1; :::; k 1. Although players in N (g k ; Q k ) would like to be in any N (g j ; Q j ) with j = 1; :::; k 1, no player in that components would like to change its position in N (g j ; Q j ), j = 1; :::; k 1, with the position of any player in
be the connected sub-coalitional network out of those that can be formed by players in S N with the highest per capita value for a majority of players in each S 0 , would be blocked by the player obtaining the highest payo¤ in each coalition S 0 , S 0 2 Q k . Finally, any (g 0 ; P 0 ) obtainable from (g; P ) v;cd via S, involving some players in some (g j ; Q j ), j = 1; :::; k 1, would be blocked by the player receiving the highest payo¤ in each coalition S 0 , S 0 2 Q j .
Discussion
Before concluding we comment upon some of the features of the model. First, the model is general enough to study the emergence of "community structures" where links between individuals belonging to di¤erent communities are infeasible. Second, we enrich the model so that overlapping collections of individuals may arise.
Community structures
Many real world social and economic networks are composed of many communities of nodes, where the nodes of the same community are highly connected, while there are few links between the nodes of di¤erent communities. 11 Suppose that two players can be linked to each other only if they belong to the same coalition. Then, the set of feasible coalitional networks becomes
This situation may be interpreted as a limit case of community structures. If there are no externalities among coalitions (which coincide with components since players cannot be linked to players belonging to other coalitions), then it is possible to stabilize the e¢ cient coalitional networks thanks to the unanimity decision rule, and this, whatever the allocation rule. However, once only the consent of more than half members of the initial coalitions of the deviating players is required, then we need to impose a speci…c allocation rule to stabilize the e¢ cient coalitional networks. and i S 00 > j 8j 2 S 0 . Let (g; P ) be an e¢ cient coalitional network with P = 11 See for instance Jackson (2008) or Wasserman and Faust (1994) . Research on community structures mainly deals with the detection of these communities in network data. fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m g. First, any deviation from (g; P ) to any (g 0 ; P ) by a coalition S S j will be blocked because (g; P ) is e¢ cient and hence in (g 0 ; P ) players in S 0 S j are worse o¤ than in (g; P ) and players in S 00 S j are equal o¤.
Second, any deviation from (g; P ) to any (g 0 ; P 0 ) by a coalition S = S 1 [ S 2 [ :::
with P 0 = P n fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::g [ fS 1 [ S 2 [ :::g will be blocked by all the deviating players in S 1 [ S 2 [ ::: that obtain a payo¤ of zero. Third, any deviation from (g; P ) to any (g 0 ; P 0 ) by a coalition S S j with P 0 = P nfS j g[fS 0 j [S 00 j [:::g and S j = S 0 j [S 00 j [::: will be blocked by all the deviating players that obtain a payo¤ of zero in every S 0 j ; S 00 j ; :::, with S j = S 0 j [ S 00 j [ ::: Fourth, any deviation from (g; P ) to any (g 0 ; P 0 ) by a coalition S with P 0 = P n fS 1 ; S 2 g [ fSg [ fS 1 n (S 1 \ S)g [ fS 2 n (S 2 \ S)g will be blocked by all the deviating players that obtain a payo¤ of zero in (g 0 ; P 0 ).
Overlapping coalitions
There are many situations in which players may belong simultaneously to more than one coalition. 12 Overlapping groups of individuals may be involved in relationships involving reciprocity, information-sharing, working half-time in two …rms, club memberships or public goods provision. A cover of N , N = f1; :::; ng being the set players, is a collection of coalitions = fS 1 ; :::; S m g such that [ m a=1 S a = N (a coalition structure is a special case of a cover). An overlapping coalitional network (g; ) consists of a network g and a cover . Let (j) = fS 2 : j 2 Sg be the set of coalitions in the cover to which player j belongs. Let = fS N : #S = 2g be the the cover where each pair of players forms a coalition. We denote by the set of all possible covers. 13 A cover value function is a function v : G N ! R which assigns a value v(g; ) to each overlapping coalitional network (g; ). An allocation rule is a function Y : G N V ! R N such that P i2N Y i (g; ; v) = v(g; ) for all v, g and which tells us how the value v(g; ) is distributed among the players. 12 The possiblity of belonging to more than one coalition means that contracts (or coalitions) are nonexclusive. 13 The notion of conference structure is any collection of conferences. The term conference refers to any set of two or more players who might meet together to discuss their cooperative plans. Thus, a conference structure is simply a cover such that for any S 2 we have jSj 2. The set of all possible conference structures is f : 8S 2 ; S N and jSj 2g which is a strict subset of . Myerson (1980) has studied allocations rules, which are functions mapping conference structures to payo¤ allocations, to describe how the outcome of a cooperative game might depend on which groups of players hold cooperative planning conferences.
An overlapping coalitional network (g 0 ; 0 ) is obtainable from (g; ) via S, S N , if (i) ij 2 g 0 and ij = 2 g implies fi; jg S, (ii) ij = 2 g 0 and ij 2 g implies fi; jg \ S 6 = ?, (iii) fS a n (S a \ S) : S a 2 ; S a = 2 0 g = fS Proof. Take the e¢ cient network g . Then, (g ; ) is contractually stable under the simple majority rule whatever the allocation rule. Indeed, for all (g 0 ; ) obtainable from (g ; ) via S there is a player i 2 N such that Y i (g 0 ; ; v) < Y i (g ; ; v) and
9S 0 2 such that i 2 S 0 and S 0 \ S 6 = ?.
In many situations, the cover (where each pair of players makes a binding contract) is not necessary to sustain the e¢ cient network and a smaller number of binding contracts may be su¢ cient to stabilize the e¢ cient network. It should be noted that, once forming coalitions (or making binding contracts) is costly, a con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency may again occur.
Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We have introduced the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network speci…es the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we have used the con- 
